

Four statements on the race question

Unesco

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Four statements on the race question

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Foreword

This booklet reproduces the texts of four statements on the race question prepared by groups of experts brought together by Unesco in 1950, 1951, 1964 and 1967, as part of its programme to make known the scientific facts about race and to combat racial prejudice. The names and qualifications of the experts responsible for the preparation of each of the statements are given at the end of each.

The statements are preceded by two essays, one by Professor Hiernaux, biologist, University of Brussels (Belgium), the other by Professor Banton, sociologist, University of Bristol (United Kingdom), on the four statements and the relationships among them. The views expressed in the essays are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Unesco.

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Biological aspects of the racial question

Jean Hiernaux

As stressed in the statement on race and racial prejudice of 1967, the basic causes of racialism are economic and social. However, those who show racial discrimination justify their attitude by ideas and illustrations taken from biology: on the one hand, the belief that there are innate value differences between human groups; on the other, the representation of the hereditary characteristics of the members of these groups in the form of stereotypes. In the racist's view, not only is one group (their own) naturally superior to all other groups, but any member of their own group is superior to any member of the other. This belief goes hand in hand with hostility to the intrusion of 'inferior' blood into the genetic inheritance of the group with which they identify themselves. This group is most often defined in terms of race; it can also be a caste or even a social class. The hierarchy established by the racist attitude is conceived mainly as affecting intelligence and behaviour, in which it attributes to each of the groups not only innate but unchanging characteristics.

What is the opinion of those who devote their life to the study of the biological differences between human beings and groups of people—namely those doing research into human biology or anthropobiology? The Unesco statements quoted below reply to this question, particularly those of 1951 and 1964, emanating from meetings of biologists. The biologists were represented insufficiently at the meeting of 1950, which gave rise to that of 1951. The statement of 1967 restates the propositions adopted in 1964, while stressing the points of 1964 which it considered essential. The biological aspects of the racial question will be presented here in the light of these

texts, in an effort to define present scientific knowledge of the subject and its recent development.

The physical and mental development of the human being is the result of the interaction of heredity and environment. Apart from the qualitative aspect of such characters as blood groups, which seems to be exempt from environmental influence, heredity determines only a potential or a tendency. For example, according to the conditions in which a person has grown up, he will at maturity reach a height of which heredity will have determined only the potential range; depending on diet, out of two individuals who have inherited the same tendency to diabetes, one may suffer from a serious form of the disease while the other may not be affected at all. The idea of race concerns the hereditary factor in the differences apparent among human beings: no one would think of considering as racial the effects of living conditions which bring about differences in the outward manifestation of the same genetic potential in different individuals.

On the purely hereditary level (the assemblage of genes which are elongated molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA, form chromosomes in the cell nucleus), and on that of the outward manifestation of the characteristics of the body (the phenotypes), no two human beings are identical (with the exception, on the genetic level, of monozygotic twins, who have come from a single fertilized ovum which has split into two, each of the parts giving rise to a complete human being). For the man in the street, as well as for the anthropologist, the idea of race includes the notion of stability of the hereditary endowment from one generation to another, or at least a tendency towards such stability. It follows from this that the individual cannot be taken as the basic unit in a study on race; none of his children, who also inherit from the other parent, is exactly similar to him. Obviously the idea of race has as its basic unit a group of individuals such that its collective genetic inheritance (the sum of the inheritances of its members) tends to remain stable throughout the generations. This is the case of a population whose members normally intermarry, in so far as genetic isolation is pronounced and the influence of the evolutionary forces and events enumerated below is slight. As regards the questions dealt with here, the

units which form a basis for study are the sections of the human race as a whole which most resemble a group of such populations. There are many of them: in Africa, south of the Sahara alone, there are well over a thousand.

Thus defined, there are no two human populations with identical hereditary endowments: at the very least, they will differ in the frequency of certain genes. Race classifications reduce the vast number of these unit-populations to a smaller number of groups (races); they may be divided into several headings (e.g. major racial group, race and sub-race). The statement of 1951 expresses the unanimity of anthropologists in considering the idea of race as a classificatory device. That of 1964 stresses that the concept of a major racial group is only a tool of classification, but remarks that either smaller groups or unit-populations themselves may be referred to as races. This had already been expressed, though less clearly, in the statement of 1950. In fact, a large number of anthropologists today define a race as a population differing from others by the frequency of certain genes; each population then constitutes a race, and this term is no longer classificatory. It is unfortunate that the same word should be used sometimes to describe the unit-populations and sometimes the groups in which these units are classified. Many people now are careful to reserve the term 'population' for the former and 'race' for the latter.

The ambiguity of the word 'race' in recent anthropological literature is due to the development of ideas, over the last few decades, concerning the justification and the desirability of establishing a classification of human populations. Those who signed the statement of 1951 see the variations among human groups essentially as a genealogical tree: race classification, which names each branch and offshoot, sums up the evolution that has taken place, and according to the statement, makes studies of the subject easier. The diversity among human populations is more often regarded today as a network formed by the factors of local specialization and numerous genetic mixtures. The evolutionary unit is the population; those which are grouped together, in the classifications, as major stocks may have very different evolutionary histories. There are those who doubt whether it is possible to establish a classification

of human populations for general use: they think it necessary to develop a system of classification appropriate to the problem in question. Most students acknowledge that there is a large dose of the arbitrary in any race classification. An increasing number of anthropobiologists are giving up any form of classification, which seems to them to be of minor usefulness in comparison with the risk of encouraging false generalizations. This development in modern human biology concerning race classifications was evident in the text of 1964 and struck the experts meeting in 1967, who drew attention to it in their statement. Having regard to popular ideas on the subject, it was essential to point out that the contemporary anthropologist does not regard the human race as naturally divided into white people, yellow people, black people, or any other sub-division, but as composed of a vast number of populations, each with its own history of development. Taken together, they form a continuum such that any attempt at classification according to selected combinations of characters leads to the conclusion that many populations are unclassifiable (which was already acknowledged in the statement of 1951).

In modern human biology, what matters is to establish the nature, extent, forms and genesis of the differences which can be seen among human populations, the genetic part of which is usually described as race difference.

Between populations of the same species, such as human populations, the differences can only be minor in comparison with what is possessed in common. Not only do the majority of hereditary characters vary from one population to another, but each of them shows a wide field of variation within one population (polymorphism). As regards measurable characteristics, the members of a population gravitate around an average value; in almost every case, the distributions of the individual values of two populations overlap. For example, if the average height of one population is ten centimetres less than that of another, there will be a noteworthy proportion of individuals in the first population who are taller than some members of the second. As for the qualitative characteristics determined by single genetic factors, e.g. blood groups, no two populations are sharply distinguished by the general possession of different

alleles.¹ Either the same alleles are present in all populations, or else all populations have at least one allele and one genotype in common. The 'stereotype' view, which regards all members of one race as similar, is already at variance with reality when only one population is in question, however little variation there may be within it.

Given a difference in the average or in the frequency of a character between two populations, it is often difficult to distinguish between what is due to a difference of inheritance, and what to the influence of environment on the manifestation of the inherited factors. For example, it is well known that a deficiency in diet, particularly of calcium and proteins, has an adverse effect on growth and reduces height at maturity. If the average height of a population is higher than that of another and the population is also better fed, it can be concluded that it has an hereditary greater-height potential only if it can be shown that the difference remains when representative groups from the two populations are placed from conception onwards (this being the real moment of birth) in the same environmental conditions.

Many differences remain to be clarified in this way, but it is certain that many populations differ in inheritance with respect to a large number of characters which show genetic variations within each one of them (leaving aside the variations which are only maintained on a very low level by recurrent mutations). The situation presented, at any period, by this diversity in hereditary endowment is the result of the continual play of a series of evolutionary factors mentioned in the statements of 1951 and 1964: mutations, which can produce similar abnormal variants of the same gene in parts of the world far removed from each other; genetic drift, the random fluctuation of gene frequencies in small populations; selection and interbreeding.

Natural selection tends to make the population genetically adapted to its environment. According to whether two populations

1. Alleles are variants of a gene. Each individual has a pair of them in his cells, one coming from his father, the other from his mother; they form the genotype for the character thus determined. The individual is said to be a homozygote if the two alleles are identical, a heterozygote if they are different.

are living in the same or in different environments, natural selection will tend to produce convergence or differentiation. In one of its forms, favouring heterozygotes, it maintains polymorphism and preserves in each population those frequencies of the alleles which correspond to adaptative equilibrium. Whether this equilibrium demands a state of genetic uniformity or of polymorphism, it can only be achieved by a population which has maintained its environment over a certain (often considerable) number of generations. As stressed in the statement of 1964, however, man's presence all over the earth, the mobility of human populations, episodes of territorial expansion and shrinkage, and frequent cross-breeding give to the natural history of the human race one of its distinguishing features: far from splitting up into subspecies which would be definitely adapted to the particular environment in which they had settled, and would differ from each other all the more for being genetically isolated (a frequent occurrence in animal species), the human race is composed of populations whose inheritances are being continually modified by gene exchanges and are moving towards states of stability which are themselves in process of change. The idea of separate and unchanging races is the exact opposite of the truth.

The result, according to the statement of 1964, is that the ability to adapt to widely varying surroundings is more marked in man than adaptation to particular environments. Moreover, man commands more and more effective cultural means of guarding against the harmful effects of environment ('culture' here meaning the total sum of knowledge and behaviour acquired through contact with other human beings). Many genetic differences are the result of selective forces which man can reduce or eliminate today. If, as the modern anthropobiologist thinks, a dark-skinned child runs a higher risk of developing rickets in a climate with little sun than does a fair-skinned child (because the melanin which colours his skin filters the scarce ultra-violet rays which are needed for the synthesis of vitamin D in the deeper layers of the skin), a few vitamin D tablets taken each winter will eliminate his handicap. The development of appropriate cultural means, moreover, is often the preliminary to man's settlement in habitats presenting extremities. Although the Eskimos show certain signs of biological adaptation to extreme

cold, they would not have been able to migrate to the polar region without fur clothing, and it is chiefly by advanced adaptation of their way of life that they have been able to maintain themselves there.

Still on the question of the interaction between genetic and cultural factors, to which the major original contribution of the statement of 1964 relates, two basic points are set forth: on the one hand, the genetic capacity for intellectual development depends on biological characteristics which are of universal value on account of their importance for the survival of the species in any natural and cultural environment; on the other hand, the progress made by man, in whatever respect, seems to have been taking place for many thousands of years mainly—if not solely—on the level of cultural acquisitions, and not on that of genetic endowment. In the light of present knowledge, the differences in cultural achievements seem to be accounted for entirely by the cultural history of the peoples. This is in direct opposition to racist thought, whose beliefs with regard to racial superiority relate mainly to intelligence and behaviour, and which attributes the cultural backwardness of certain peoples to genetic inferiority. No genetic difference between peoples, however, has ever been proved in this sphere. Admittedly, research on this point is very difficult. There is no psychological test by which the innate factor in mental capacities or affective tendencies can be measured alone. But whenever the conditions for the mental development of two populations begin to resemble each other, the differences in the average of the test results are reduced or eliminated; they tend to become reversed when the inequalities of environment are reversed. Biology today can not deny the possibility that one day differences in hereditary endowment may be shown to exist between human populations for mental characteristics which depend in the individual on the interaction of heredity and environment, the hereditary component varying from one person to another in the same population. It can say, however, that if this is so, these differences are such that the distribution curves of the innate aptitudes in the populations overlap very considerably, thus precluding any generalization or stereotyping. The state of affairs reflected in the statement of 1951 on this question remains strictly the same today. The points made in the statement of

1964, referred to above, add to this the basis of an explanation, in terms of evolution, of the apparent equality of human populations with regard to a character partially determined by heredity, when these populations differ in so many other respects: so far as this character is concerned, on account of its fundamental value for the species, the whole of mankind has progressed genetically *en bloc*, until a similar level has been reached everywhere.

There is one last prejudice which the Unesco statements show to be quite unfounded: the belief that race mixture is harmful. It must be remembered that there is no pure human race, in the meaning which biologists give to this term, a genetically homogeneous population; on the contrary, every human population presents wide diversity. No population has lived long in genetic isolation, and the very fabric of man's natural history is intermixture. Like that of 1951, the statement of 1964 notes that interbreeding presents no biological disadvantage for mankind (incompatibilities, such as those presented by the Rh blood groups, depend on the genotype of the couple for the system involved, and not on their race); but further it stresses the beneficial side of interbreeding, which contributes largely to the maintenance of biological ties between human groups, and thus to the unity of the species in its diversity.

With regard to the fundamental questions raised by the diversity of humankind, the successive statements of the biologists called together by Unesco constitute so many landmarks in the development of anthropobiology. The conclusions reached in this subject refute more and more completely the racist way of thinking and deny any biological justification for discriminatory practices between human groups.

Social aspects of the race question

Michael Banton

Race is a relatively new idea. It emerged in the nineteenth century as the evidence for evolution began to accumulate. Prior to this time Europeans generally had believed that the book of Genesis furnished a historical account of man's creation and the peopling of the world. Race was an exciting idea. Scientists thought it offered a key to human history, one that would explain why the peoples of the world differed so much in their civilizations and in their technological achievements. They were wrong, but it took some years before the mistake became apparent. In the meantime the error was seized upon, magnified, and publicized, because it was convenient from the standpoint of those who held power in the Europe of that day. Europeans were flattered when they were told that they were superior to the peoples of the technologically backward countries. The possibility of a biological origin of these differences was therefore entertained more sympathetically than the evidence warranted.

Doctrines of racial distinction and superiority cast a dark shadow over the history of the world in the first half of the twentieth century. They played an important part in imperialist arrogance. Then they were utilized for political ends within nations, most notoriously in Nazi Germany. Six million Jews were sacrificed to beliefs about race which had no scientific validity. After the Second World War, Unesco naturally identified racist doctrines as a major source of world tension. Unesco was the international institution best placed to collect and diffuse scientific findings about the nature of race and the significance of differences between human groups.

A team of experts was asked to explain in simple terms the outcome of scientific inquiry into the nature of racial differences, and to indicate what were the implications for social relations.

They were quite clear that the central issue is that of equality. Ideas about race had been built into a social myth which had been used to deny equality to peoples of another race. The scientific facts, they said, contradicted this myth. But, they insisted 'it must be asserted with the utmost emphasis that equality as an ethical principle in no way depends upon the assertion that human beings are in fact equal in endowment'. Men are not equal in talents, this is a fact. But it is generally believed that the weak deserve sympathy. The unfeeling treatment of the unfortunate is held to be inhuman. Therefore, so people say, all men must be showed respect: they are equal in dignity and rights. This is a moral precept. It is independent from statements about actual equality or inequality. Nor does it lose any of its moral force because it is so often ignored by men.

In retrospect, it looks as if there were two weaknesses in the 1950 declaration. Firstly, it appears to assume that once the erroneous nature of racist doctrines had been exposed, the structure of racial prejudice and discrimination would collapse. The eminent scholars who signed the document did not themselves believe this, but the committee did not consider explicitly the other sources of racial hostility. Secondly, the document has what now seems a slightly out-of-date air in that the experts were primarily concerned with the equal potential of different racial groups and did not treat explicitly the problems of contact between groups—apart from a reference to race mixture, a statement that biological differences should be disregarded from the standpoint of social action and the possibly ambiguous reference to man's need to interact with his fellows. Today the chief racial questions are not those of separate development but of the interrelations within nation-states of people assigned to different racial categories.

Yet these were not the grounds on which the statement of 1950 was criticized at the time. It was the biologists who complained that the phraseology did not fully reflect the shift towards the statistical conception of racial traits. Some felt that the statement about an 'ethic of universal brotherhood' went beyond what could be affirmed on scientific grounds. Yet others were disquieted by what they regarded as 'attempts to solve scientific questions by political manifestos'. In science the only authority is that of the facts. The Nazi episode showed how

dangerous it could be for any doctrine to be regarded as authoritative. Was Unesco repeating the Nazi error in reverse? Expert opinion on such problems was collected and published in the Unesco booklet *The Race Concept: Results of an Inquiry*. This report provides useful background material to the statement of 1951.

What happened? Unesco publicized these statements and undertook other projects designed to improve understanding of racial questions. Educational campaigns were mounted. More important, probably, most colonial nations won their independence and were admitted to the United Nations. Whether racial prejudice and discrimination were much reduced it is difficult to say. African students in European cities thought the changes brought them a new pride and dignity. But political leaders in their home countries complained that they were still dependent upon Europe and North America for the capital resources they wanted to finance development programmes. New population movements occurred which brought previously separated peoples into closer contact and increased the points at which the sparks of hostility could be struck. African, West Indian, Indian and Pakistani workers migrated to their former metropolitan countries, the United Kingdom and France, in search of work. Indonesians who had never previously left the land of their birth, but were Dutch citizens, took ship to the Netherlands. Negro farm workers in the Southern region of the United States were driven from the land as tractors and mechanical harvesters were adopted; they, and their families, travelled north and to the cities. In South Africa the government intensified its efforts to enforce a pattern of separation. Over much of the globe it seemed as if racial friction was growing more frequent and more intense.

In 1964 another group of experts assembled to bring up to date the statement of physical anthropologists and geneticists. They reinforced the earlier document in testifying that 'it is not possible from the biological point of view to speak in any way whatsoever of a general inferiority or superiority of this or that race' (para. 6). But inevitably, being concerned with the biological aspects of the question, they could say nothing directly relevant to the changes in the world situation. The one move in this direction was the concluding observation that 'the biological

data... stand in open contradiction to the tenets of racism'. This was the first occasion in which the word racism had been used in one of the Unesco declarations. The word is a relatively new one and it is employed in different senses. One of the first writers to make extended use of it was Ruth Benedict who comes nearest to a definition when she writes that 'racism is the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority'.¹ Social scientists have, in general, followed this lead in viewing racism as essentially a doctrine. The kernel of this doctrine is found in the assertions: (a) that people's culture and psychological characteristics are genetically determined; and (b) that the genetic determinants are grouped in patterns that can be identified with human races in the old sense which envisaged the existence of pure races. Grouping these features into a definition, racism can be defined as the doctrine that a man's behaviour is determined by stable inherited characters deriving from separate racial stocks having distinctive attributes and usually considered to stand to one another in relations of superiority and inferiority.

The panel of experts who convened in 1967 included sociologists, lawyers, a social psychologist, an ethnographer, a historian and two geneticists. Asked to adopt a declaration covering the social, ethical and philosophical aspects of the problem, they were faced with a more difficult task than their predecessors. To take a stance similar to that of 1950 would have been to overlook the source of the trouble. The trend of events had shown that something more was needed than high principle and biological sophistication. The difficulty was compounded by the near certainty that whatever their views they could not draft a statement to which all their colleagues in the social sciences, law and the humanities could give whole-hearted assent. Social scientists, and sociologists especially, are deeply divided on the question of whether they should cultivate a detachment from political issues or seek, through personal involvement, to apply their special insight in overcoming conflicts. Some would say that to develop their distinctive contribution as scientists they must limit themselves to what can be established as factually

1. Ruth Benedict, *Race: Science and Politics*, 1940.

undeniable. Others claim that it is better to follow the model of the medical scientist and to regard certain social features (like racism) as diseases which have to be fought.

To have sought to follow the first course, that of detachment, would have entailed grappling with problems which a heterogeneous panel cannot resolve in the course of a single meeting. For as Ruth Benedict wrote, 'to understand race conflict we need fundamentally to understand conflict not race'. The study of race conflict is almost identical with the study of human society itself, for there is no separate category of 'racial behaviour' that can be isolated from other categories of behaviour. To understand race relations in a school or in an automobile assembly workshop it is necessary first to understand how a school or an automobile assembly workshop is organized. A panel of experts could have prepared an account of what has been discovered about the psychological causes of prejudice. But the findings in this field do not lend themselves to simple presentation. Similarly an account of what sociologists or political scientists have discovered would need to be lengthy and detailed if it were to do justice to the complexity of the issues or the scholarly quality of the research. Some of the facts seem to be contradictory and there may be differences of opinion as to which of them will prove the more significant. The dangers in simplification are probably more acute in the social than in the biological sciences.

In the event, the committee of 1967 followed the second course. Their statement comprises a diagnosis, a warning, and a series of recommendations. The tone of their document is uncompromising. It differs from the three preceding ones in expressing a passionate involvement in the issues. It is as if the signatories are saying to their readers 'racial prejudice and discrimination will not be stopped by the issue of cautious statements to the effect that scientists have not yet discovered any racial differences of importance to social relations; statements about what social scientists have discovered will be no more helpful if they are limited to what has been incontrovertibly established; time is short, so we must act on the basis of possibly incomplete knowledge and extirpate this virus before it causes more suffering'. They express themselves in terms chosen to convey a sense of urgency: racism haunts the world; it stultifies

and perverts; it seeks to make existing differences appear inviolable; it finds ever new stratagems for justifying inequality. The social scientists, it is said, should demonstrate the causes of racism. The major techniques for combating it lie in the fields of education, housing policy, employment policy, mass communication and legislation. The signatories recognize that important changes in such fields may require decisions of a political character. In outlining the changes they wish to see, the signatories make several statements of an ethical character expressing what they personally believe to be the morally right response. For example, they state that where 'groups have a lower average education and economic standing, it is the responsibility of the society to take corrective measures', i.e. to exercise positive discrimination (para. 14). Sociologists may believe as individuals that this is the right thing to do but they cannot prove it. The use of positive discrimination to help a backward group catch up can evoke resentment from other groups. Policies of this kind require careful management and the advice which social scientists can offer to politicians is only fragmentary.

In combating racial discrimination, the first essential is a correct diagnosis. The importance of this is not always appreciated because of the moral indignation which discrimination evokes and the reluctance of the activists to accept any delay. But mistakes are sometimes made which cause anti-discrimination campaigns to be fruitless or even to exacerbate the situation. For example, some groups thought that if, by conducting a survey, they were to expose the prevalence of discrimination, this would shock people into taking or supporting remedial action. Frequently it has the reverse effect. Those who discriminate derive support from learning that so many others do so too. The authorities may take fright and decline to act against what they see as a powerful section of the population. Another mistake can be seen when members of a disadvantaged minority lose patience with the majority and accuse all its members of being racist or prejudiced. This tactic is sometimes seen as justified by those who believe that history proceeds dialectically, oppositions being intensified before they are overcome, but there is little evidence to suggest that it is ever successful in reducing discrimination.

Diagnoses can be more reliable when they relate to relatively small units or to specific situations. Nevertheless there are occasions when it is useful to attempt a diagnosis of the world situation. The 1967 statement is in part such an attempt. In this connection it is important to note that these experts agreed that there is no single cause of racial hostility. There are various causes and the relative importance of one cause or the other varies according to the situation in question. The statement declares that the social and economic causes of prejudice are easily seen in certain circumstances and follows this with a short list. The terms employed in this list are very general, almost as embracing as the remark that among the causes 'the social structure is always an important factor'. This is so general as to be platitudinous! The evidence itself is complex and incomplete. Moreover, the concepts presently employed by social scientists are much less precise, and less generally agreed, than those used by the biologists. It would therefore have been difficult for this committee to make any comprehensive statement about the social causes of prejudice that could be understood by the general public or could command as much scientific authority as the 1964 statement on the biological aspects. In the same paragraph (para. 11) the 1967 statement goes on to refer to personality troubles as a source of prejudice. This, too, is a complicated matter. The statement that the foundations of prejudice lie in the economic and social system is open to differing interpretations because much depends on the meaning attached to the word 'foundations'. It would be unfortunate if such a claim were taken to imply that it is unnecessary to conduct further research into the psychological origins of prejudice. Important questions remain to be answered concerning the interrelation between the psychological factors on the one hand, and the economic and social system on the other. There is some experimental evidence to suggest that any kind of distinction that causes people to think in terms of 'people like me' and 'other people' attracts to it emotional meanings and results in the expression of preferences which are not justified by the nature of the difference. When a minority is outwardly distinguished—as by skin colour—the greater the difference the stronger are the emotional associations. Such psychological factors are important in the generation of prejudice and

appear to be independent of particular economic and social systems.

The 1967 statement stresses the social and economic factors underlying the denial of racial equality but it devotes more attention to racism. It states that racism is 'a particularly striking obstacle to recognition of equal dignity for all' (para. 1). In view of the importance the committee attached to this, it is unfortunate that they did not hammer out a clearer definition of what they meant by the key term. By racism they apparently meant 'anti-social beliefs and acts which are based on the fallacy that discriminatory inter-group relations are justifiable on biological grounds' (para. 4). There are many features of this as a definition which require examination: the use of evaluative terms like 'anti-social' and 'fallacy' in a definition of this kind; the lumping together of beliefs and acts; the criteria for deciding whether an action is based on a fallacy, etc. If social scientists are to make a distinctive contribution to popular understanding in this emotionally and intellectually confused area of discussion, it is important that their diagnoses be clear and systematic. It would be unfortunate if a reader were to get the impression that expert opinion amongst social scientists is agreed that the root cause of racial tension is a sort of virus called racism; one which 'finds ever new stratagems for justifying the inequality of groups' as if it had a life of its own. Racism is not an organism. It is a word used to classify certain doctrines and, by extension, beliefs and actions associated with such doctrines. There is a danger that preoccupation with racism might cause people to neglect other factors which impede the achievement of equal rights.

Indeed, recent changes in several countries give grounds for suspecting that racist doctrines are losing the significance they once possessed. A complete enumeration is out of the question here, but brief reference may be made, by way of example only, to changes in three countries with which the author is particularly familiar. In the 1968 presidential campaign in the United States of America, ethnic group sentiments and loyalties could be evoked without mention of race. A speaker had only to refer to the need to maintain law and order and his listeners took the remark to be directed against Negroes. White Americans do not need a doctrine to assuage guilt feelings over the treatment of

the Negro. Many of them feel threatened by Negro demands. White hostility functions so as to defend the privileged position which the Whites have secured and believe they deserve. Whites seem on the whole to regard the issue as part of a power struggle; biological arguments excite little interest. In the United Kingdom, the debate about race relations was for some years conducted as a debate about the control of immigration from the Commonwealth. In 1968 a Race Relations Act designed to penalize discrimination against minority members within the country was agreed by parliament without differences of principle between the parties. Those who argued most fiercely for the exclusion of coloured immigrants and were most critical of the legislation have increasingly stressed the social difficulties hindering assimilation and have complained that in areas where the immigrants settle the character of the local community is destroyed. These critics have frequently been careful to disavow any belief in racial superiority and have not employed racist doctrines. In southern Africa, too, it seems as if policies implying the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are more and more defended on political and cultural rather than pseudo-biological grounds.

These developments have important implications for diagnosing the problem to be dealt with. It is not unusual for the label 'racist' to be applied to individuals who never formulate any racist doctrine. They may not be educated enough to do so or may never work out systematically the implications of their everyday thoughts. Nevertheless, it is assumed that if they were to systematize their ideas they would eventually subscribe to doctrines according to which racial differences determine cultural differences and must therefore form a basis for social policy. This may be changing. If so, it may be in part a consequence of the sociologists' own work. They have shown, especially by their research in the educational field, that inequality can be transmitted from generation to generation by social mechanisms. A child whose home background supports his educational endeavours may obtain better marks after a time than a youngster who scores higher on intelligence tests but does not have the same encouragement to persevere. The structure of inequality in modern industrial societies can be explained far more convincingly in social and economic than in genetic terms. So an educated man who wishes to exclude minority members from

the privileges of the majority may turn to sociological findings for a rationalization. His arguments would be unscathed by the accusation of racism as this term has hitherto been understood. Measures directed against racism should therefore not be conceived in isolation but as part of a wider attempt to achieve equality in respect of human rights.

There is also evidence accumulating which indicates that the expression of prejudice may not be a hostility directed against the group which serves as an ostensible target, so much as an affirmation of solidarity with the group to which the speaker belongs. In the industrial cities of Europe and North America many men rarely come into meaningful contact with people of a background very different from their own. They live in districts inhabited by people of similar income and ancestry. On the way to work and at the workplace they meet strangers for the most part only in well-defined relationships. Their prejudices are expressed most frequently in situations where no minority persons are present. The way men behave towards members of other groups when they do meet them, may not be in accordance with the opinions they have expressed on other occasions. This evidence shows that the significance race has for an individual will depend upon his social position and his actions will be related to the situations in which contact occurs. Established patterns of social relations are now changing rapidly so this will affect the ways in which prejudice is generated and expressed. People now have greater insight into the way their behaviour is influenced by psychological and social pressures. The changing relations between belief, statements made to onlookers, and behaviour in social situations, underly the complexity of prejudice as a social phenomenon.

The declaration of 1967 differs from that of 1950 in another respect which is worthy of note. The earlier committee maintained that human groups distinguished by racial traits would be better referred to as 'ethnic groups' rather than 'races' (para. 6). Social scientists are in fact deeply divided about whether it is proper to use the terminology of race when designating nationalities or minorities. Some believe that its use only perpetuates the confusion of social with biological categories. Some speak of 'social race', though this expression may be no improvement. The 1967 document chooses to say

nothing of this division of opinion, presumably for fear that it might weaken the statement's impact. But by interpreting their task in this way, the signatories may have distracted some readers' attention from the important similarities between the situations of racial minorities and of other minorities, religious, linguistic, and economic. There are many people in industrial societies who suffer from physical or social disablement and are trapped by their handicaps just as are members of racial minorities. The study of how they come to be trapped reveals important lessons about how the social and economic system works in some of its less public aspects. The mechanisms which operate against non-racial minorities also operate against racial minorities. They need to be studied because in some circumstances they may prove more important than the special disabilities which sometimes attach to distinctive racial characteristics.

An important feature of many situations where people are distinguished by racial characteristics is the cumulative nature of such distinctions. As the 1967 statement notes, discrimination deprives a group of equal treatment. Members of that group are then unable to perform as well as others so they are more likely to be despised, called inferior, or made the objects of prejudice. Cumulation can operate in other ways, bringing unanticipated and undesired consequences. So much depends upon the initial categorization of strangers. Europeans or white Americans living in districts where coloured people are also starting to reside, are apt to complain 'soon there will be more black people than white'. This seems to them a logical way of seeing things, partly because they identify whiteness with a wide range of cultural characteristics shared by the local population and blackness with other cultural characteristics shared by the newcomers. But in a new environment customs change and cultural differences are reduced. The important question from most standpoints is not whether there will be more black people than white, but more good citizens than bad.

Whenever a society has adopted colour as a more important principle for social classification than citizenship, unwelcome consequences have followed. It has meant that the differences between racial groups have continually been emphasized and differences within these groups have been minimized.

Children of mixed ancestry have been classified in the lower category; they have been hated because their very existence proved that the maintenance of a colour line was a social convention. Once people start assuming that a racial classification is 'natural' other social arrangements are fashioned so as to fit with the racial one. Some people (on both sides of the line) acquire a vested interest in the prevailing order. Those who suffer from discrimination feel loyalty to others who also suffer, and defend them in ways that anger members of the majority. Tension builds up. In many countries, on widely separated continents, racial conflict has been occurring on an ever greater scale. The lines of division have become ever sharper. Now racial opposition can sometimes be discerned on the international level.

Logically, the point at which to challenge the increasing scale of conflict is at the first step. The importance of other ways of classifying people—like good citizens and bad—needs to be emphasized whenever there is opportunity. But in many parts of the world such advice comes too late. Important social groups are identified by racial signs. Community structures have been built on the basis of such divisions. Every available means of diminishing prejudice and discrimination therefore needs to be used. The 1967 statement mentions the most important. In some places the first priority may be to try and implement what they say about education; elsewhere it may be more important to tackle problems of local administration or national legislation. To argue in the abstract about the relative merits of one technique compared with another, or about the chances of ever completely eliminating prejudice, is to ignore the main issue. The question of equality is an ethical and political one. The contribution of the social sciences is essential to a correct diagnosis and to the evaluation of the merits and demerits of different policies; but it would be dishonest to make these sciences take the responsibility for political decisions or to argue that serious governmental action must wait until social scientists have a complete understanding of prejudice.

Much of the confusion among the educated public about the biological aspects of the race question has in recent years been laid to rest, but pseudo-scientific racism has not been eliminated. Many dangerous misapprehensions exist and could be magnified.

Better biology teaching is needed. The only safeguard against those who take scientific findings about inheritance out of their context and seek to use them for political ends, is a better understanding throughout the population of biological principles. This is needed as a safeguard against doctrines of class superiority as well as of racial superiority.

The social aspects of the race question will almost certainly remain problematical for many years. They are intricately involved with the general problem of inequality in human societies. Changes in technology will give rise to new forms of inequality, to new problems which will require new solutions. Experience shows that it is no use ignoring the social significance ascribed to race in the hope that people will stop thinking in racial terms and therefore the problems will solve itself gradually. Experience shows that to regulate conflicts of this kind governmental and institutional intervention is essential. The longer it is postponed, the more it costs.

I Statement on race

Paris, July 1950

1. Scientists have reached general agreement in recognizing that mankind is one: that all men belong to the same species, *homo sapiens*. It is further generally agreed among scientists that all men are probably derived from the same common stock; and that such differences as exist between different groups of mankind are due to the operation of evolutionary factors of differentiation such as isolation, the drift and random fixation of the material particles which control heredity (the genes), changes in the structure of these particles, hybridization, and natural selection. In these ways groups have arisen of varying stability and degree of differentiation which have been classified in different ways for different purposes.

2. From the biological standpoint, the species *homo sapiens* is made up of a number of populations, each one of which differs from the others in the frequency of one or more genes. Such genes, responsible for the hereditary differences between men, are always few when compared to the whole genetic constitution of man and to the vast number of genes common to all human beings regardless of the population to which they belong. This means that the likenesses among men are far greater than their differences.

3. A race, from the biological standpoint, may therefore be defined as one of the group of populations constituting the species *homo sapiens*. These populations are capable of interbreeding with one another but, by virtue of the isolating barriers which in the past kept them more or less separated, exhibit certain physical differences as a result of their somewhat different biological histories. These represent variations, as it were, on a common theme.

4. In short, the term 'race' designates a group or popu-

lation characterized by some concentrations, relative as to frequency and distribution, of hereditary particles (genes) or physical characters, which appear, fluctuate, and often disappear in the course of time by reason of geographic and/or cultural isolation. The varying manifestations of these traits in different populations are perceived in different ways by each group. What is perceived is largely preconceived, so that each group arbitrarily tends to misinterpret the variability which occurs as a fundamental difference which separates that group from all others.

5. These are the scientific facts. Unfortunately, however, when most people use the term 'race' they do not do so in the sense above defined. To most people, a race is any group of people whom they choose to describe as a race. Thus, many national, religious, geographic, linguistic or cultural groups have, in such loose usage, been called 'race', when obviously Americans are not a race, nor are Englishmen, nor Frenchmen, nor any other national group. Catholics, Protestants, Moslems, and Jews are not races, nor are groups who speak English or any other language thereby definable as a race; people who live in Iceland or England or India are not races; nor are people who are culturally Turkish or Chinese or the like thereby describable as races.

6. National, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups: and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated genetic connexion with racial traits. Because serious errors of this kind are habitually committed when the term 'race' is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term 'race' altogether and speak of ethnic groups.

7. Now what has the scientist to say about the groups of mankind which may be recognized at the present time? Human races can be and have been differently classified by different anthropologists, but at the present time most anthropologists agree on classifying the greater part of the present-day mankind into three major divisions as follows: (a) the Mongoloid division; (b) the Negroid division; and (c) the Caucasoid division. The biological processes which the classifier has here embalmed, as it were, are dynamic, not static. These divisions were not

the same in the past as they are at present, and there is every reason to believe that they will change in the future.

8. Many sub-groups or ethnic groups within these divisions have been described. There is no general agreement upon their number, and in any event most ethnic groups have not yet been either studied or described by the physical anthropologists.

9. Whatever classification the anthropologist makes of man, he never includes mental characteristics as part of those classifications. It is now generally recognized that intelligence tests do not in themselves enable us to differentiate safely between what is due to innate capacity and what is the result of environmental influences, training and education. Wherever it has been possible to make allowances for differences in environmental opportunities, the tests have shown essential similarity in mental characters among all human groups. In short, given similar degrees of cultural opportunity to realize their potentialities, the average achievement of the members of each ethnic group is about the same. The scientific investigations of recent years fully support the dictum of Confucius (551-478 B.C.): 'Men's natures are alike; it is their habits that carry them far apart.'

10. The scientific material available to us at present does not justify the conclusion that inherited genetic differences are a major factor in producing the differences between the cultures and cultural achievements of different peoples or groups. It does indicate, however, that the history of the cultural experience which each group has undergone is the major factor in explaining such differences. The one trait which above all others has been at a premium in the evolution of men's mental characters has been educability, plasticity. This is a trait which all human beings possess. It is indeed, a species character of *homo sapiens*.

11. So far as temperament is concerned, there is no definite evidence that there exist inborn differences between human groups. There is evidence that whatever group differences of the kind there might be are greatly overridden by the individual differences, and by the differences springing from environmental factors.

12. As for personality and character, these may be considered raceless. In every human group a rich variety of personality

and character types will be found, and there is no reason for believing that any human group is richer than any other in these respects.

13. With respect to race mixture, the evidence points unequivocally to the fact that this has been going on from the earliest times. Indeed, one of the chief processes of race formation and race extinction or absorption is by means of hybridization between races or ethnic groups. Furthermore, no convincing evidence has been adduced that race mixture of itself produces biologically bad effects. Statements that human hybrids frequently show undesirable traits, both physically and mentally, physical disharmonies and mental degeneracies, are not supported by the facts. There is, therefore, no biological justification for prohibiting intermarriage between persons of different ethnic groups.

14. The biological fact of race and the myth of 'race' should be distinguished. For all practical social purposes 'race' is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth. The myth of 'race' has created an enormous amount of human and social damage. In recent years it has taken a heavy toll in human lives and caused untold suffering. It still prevents the normal development of millions of human beings and deprives civilization of the effective co-operation of productive minds. The biological differences between ethnic groups should be disregarded from the standpoint of social acceptance and social action. The unity of mankind from both the biological and social viewpoints is the main thing. To recognize this and to act accordingly is the first requirement of modern man. It is but to recognize what a great biologist wrote in 1875: 'As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations and races.' These are the words of Charles Darwin in *The Descent of Man* (2nd ed., 1875, p. 187-8). And, indeed, the whole of human history shows that a co-operative spirit is not only natural to men, but more deeply rooted than any self-seeking tendencies. If this were not so we should

not see the growth of integration and organization of his communities which the centuries and the millenniums plainly exhibit.

15. We now have to consider the bearing of these statements on the problem of human equality. It must be asserted with the utmost emphasis that equality as an ethical principle in no way depends upon the assertion that human beings are in fact equal in endowment. Obviously individuals in all ethnic groups vary greatly among themselves in endowment. Nevertheless, the characteristics in which human groups differ from one another are often exaggerated and used as a basis for questioning the validity of equality in the ethical sense. For this purpose we have thought it worth while to set out in a formal manner what is at present scientifically established concerning individual and group differences.

- (a) In matters of race, the only characteristics which anthropologists can effectively use as a basis for classifications are physical and physiological.
- (b) According to present knowledge there is no proof that the groups of mankind differ in their innate mental characteristics, whether in respect of intelligence or temperament. The scientific evidence indicates that the range of mental capacities in all ethnic groups is much the same.
- (c) Historical and sociological studies support the view that genetic differences are not of importance in determining the social and cultural differences between different groups of *homo sapiens*, and that the social and cultural changes in different groups have, in the main, been independent of changes in inborn constitution. Vast social changes have occurred which were not in any way connected with changes in racial type.
- (d) There is no evidence that race mixture as such produces bad results from the biological point of view. The social results of race mixture whether for good or ill are to be traced to social factors.
- (e) All normal human beings are capable of learning to share in a common life, to understand the nature of mutual service and reciprocity, and to respect social obligations and contracts. Such biological differences as exist between members of different ethnic groups have no relevance to

problems of social and political organization, moral life and communication between human beings.

Lastly, biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood; for man is born with drives toward co-operation, and unless these drives are satisfied, men and nations alike fall ill. Man is born a social being who can reach his fullest development only through interaction with his fellows. The denial at any point of this social bond between men and man brings with it disintegration. In this sense, every man is his brother's keeper. For every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main, because he is involved in mankind.

Original statement drafted at Unesco House, Paris, by the following experts:

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II Statement on the nature of race and race differences

Paris, June 1951

The reasons for convening a second meeting of experts to discuss the concept of race were chiefly these:

Race is a question of interest to many different kinds of people, not only to the public at large, but to sociologists, anthropologists and biologists, especially those dealing with problems of genetics. At the first discussion on the problem of race, it was chiefly sociologists who gave their opinions and framed the 'Statement on race'. That statement had a good effect, but it did not carry the authority of just those groups within whose special province fall the biological problems of race, namely the physical anthropologists and geneticists. Secondly, the first statement did not, in all its details, carry conviction of these groups and, because of this, it was not supported by many authorities in these two fields.

In general, the chief conclusions of the first statement were sustained, but with differences in emphasis and with some important deletions.

There was no delay or hesitation or lack of unanimity in reaching the primary conclusion that there were no scientific grounds whatever for the racialist position regarding purity of race and the hierarchy of inferior and superior races to which this leads.

We agreed that all races were mixed and that intraracial variability in most biological characters was as great as, if not greater than, interracial variability.

We agreed that races had reached their present states by the operation of evolutionary factors by which different proportions of similar hereditary elements (genes) had become characteristic of different, partially separated groups. The source of these elements seemed to all of us to be the variability

which arises by random mutation, and the isolating factors bringing about racial differentiation by preventing intermingling of groups with different mutations, chiefly geographical for the main groups such as African, European and Asiatic.

Man, we recognized, is distinguished as much by his culture as by his biology, and it was clear to all of us that many of the factors leading to the formation of minor races of men have been cultural. Anything that tends to prevent free exchange of genes amongst groups is a potential race-making factor and these partial barriers may be religious, social and linguistic, as well as geographical.

We were careful to avoid dogmatic definitions of race, since, as a product of evolutionary factors, it is a dynamic rather than a static concept. We were equally careful to avoid saying that, because races were all variable and many of them graded into each other, therefore races did not exist. The physical anthropologists and the man in the street both know that races exist; the former, from the scientifically recognizable and measurable congeries of traits which he uses in classifying the varieties of man; the latter from the immediate evidence of his senses when he sees an African, a European, an Asiatic and an American Indian together.

We had no difficulty in agreeing that no evidence of differences in innate mental ability between different racial groups has been adduced, but that here too intraracial variability is at least as great as interracial variability. We agreed that psychological traits could not be used in classifying races, nor could they serve as parts of racial descriptions.

We were fortunate in having as members of our conference several scientists who had made special studies of the results of intermarriage between members of different races. This meant that our conclusion that race mixture in general did not lead to disadvantageous results was based on actual experience as well as upon study of the literature. Many of our members thought it quite likely that hybridization of different races could lead to biologically advantageous results, although there was insufficient evidence to support any conclusion.

Since race, as a word, has become coloured by its misuse in connexion with national, linguistic and religious differences, and by its deliberate abuse by racialists, we tried to find a

new word to express the same meaning of a biologically differentiated group. On this we did not succeed, but agreed to reserve race as the word to be used for anthropological classification of groups showing definite combinations of physical (including physiological) traits in characteristic proportions.

We also tried hard, but again we failed, to reach some general statement about the inborn nature of man with respect to his behaviour toward his fellows. It is obvious that members of a group show co-operative or associative behaviour towards each other, while members of different groups may show aggressive behaviour towards each other and both of these attitudes may occur within the same individual. We recognized that the understanding of the psychological origin of race prejudice was an important problem which called for further study.

Nevertheless, having regard to the limitations of our present knowledge, all of us believed that the biological differences found amongst human racial groups can in no case justify the views of racial inequality which have been based on ignorance and prejudice, and that all of the differences which we know can well be disregarded for all ethical human purposes.

L. C. Dunn (rapporteur), June 1951

1

Scientists are generally agreed that all men living today belong to a single species, *homo sapiens*, and are derived from a common stock, even though there is some dispute as to when and how different human groups diverged from this common stock.

The concept of race is unanimously regarded by anthropologists as a classificatory device providing a zoological frame within which the various groups of mankind may be arranged and by means of which studies of evolutionary processes can be facilitated. In its anthropological sense, the word 'race' should be reserved for groups of mankind possessing well-developed and primarily heritable physical differences from other groups. Many populations can be so classified but, because

of the complexity of human history, there are also many populations which cannot easily be fitted into a racial classification.

2

Some of the physical differences between human groups are due to differences in hereditary constitution and some to differences in the environments in which they have been brought up. In most cases, both influences have been at work. The science of genetics suggests that the hereditary differences among populations of a single species are the results of the action of two sets of processes. On the one hand, the genetic composition of isolated populations is constantly but gradually being altered by natural selection and by occasional changes (mutations) in the material particles (genes) which control heredity. Populations are also affected by fortuitous changes in gene frequency and by marriage customs. On the other hand, crossing is constantly breaking down the differentiations so set up. The new mixed populations, in so far as they, in turn, become isolated, are subject to the same processes, and these may lead to further changes. Existing races are merely the result, considered at a particular moment in time, of the total effect of such processes on the human species. The hereditary characters to be used in the classification of human groups, the limits of their variation within these groups, and thus the extent of the classificatory sub-divisions adopted may legitimately differ according to the scientific purpose in view.

3

National, religious, geographical, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups; and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated connexion with racial traits. Americans are not a race, nor are Frenchmen, nor Germans; nor *ipso facto* is any other national group. Moslems and Jews are no more races than are Roman Catholics and Protestants; nor are people who live in Iceland or Britain or India, or who speak English or any other language, or who are culturally Turkish or Chinese and the like, thereby describable as races. The use of the term 'race' in speaking of such groups may be a serious error, but it is one which is habitually committed.

4

Human races can be, and have been, classified in different ways by different anthropologists. Most of them agree in classifying the greater part of existing mankind into at least three large units, which may be called major groups (in French *grand-races*, in German *Hauptrassen*). Such a classification does not depend on any single physical character, nor does for example, skin colour by itself necessarily distinguish one major group from another. Furthermore, so far as it has been possible to analyse them, the differences in physical structure which distinguish one major group from another give no support to popular notions of any general 'superiority' or 'inferiority' which are sometimes implied in referring to these groups.

Broadly speaking, individuals belonging to different major groups of mankind are distinguishable by virtue of their physical characters, but individual members, or small groups belonging to different races within the same major group are usually not so distinguishable. Even the major groups grade into each other, and the physical traits by which they and the races within them are characterized overlap considerably. With respect to most, if not all, measurable characters, the differences among individuals belonging to the same race are greater than the differences that occur between the observed averages for two or more races within the same major group.

5

Most anthropologists do not include mental characteristics in their classification of human races. Studies within a single race have shown that both innate capacity and environmental opportunity determine the results of tests of intelligence and temperament, though their relative importance is disputed.

When intelligence tests, even non-verbal, are made on a group of non-literate people, their scores are usually lower than those of more civilized people. It has been recorded that different groups of the same race occupying similarly high levels of civilization may yield considerable differences in intelligence tests. When, however, the two groups have been brought up from childhood in similar environments, the differences are usually very slight. Moreover, there is good evidence that, given similar opportunities, the average performance (that is to say,

the performance of the individual who is representative because he is surpassed by as many as he surpasses), and the variation round it, do not differ appreciably from one race to another.

Even those psychologists who claim to have found the greatest differences in intelligence between groups of different racial origin and have contended that they are hereditary, always report that some members of the group of inferior performance surpass not merely the lowest ranking member of the superior group but also the average of its members. In any case, it has never been possible to separate members of two groups on the basis of mental capacity, as they can often be separated on a basis of religion, skin colour, hair form or language. It is possible, though not proved, that some types of innate capacity for intellectual and emotional responses are commoner in one human group than in another, but it is certain that, within a single group, innate capacities vary as much as, if not more than, they do between different groups.

The study of the heredity of psychological characteristics is beset with difficulties. We know that certain mental diseases and defects are transmitted from one generation to the next, but we are less familiar with the part played by heredity in the mental life of normal individuals. The normal individual, irrespective of race, is essentially educable. It follows that his intellectual and moral life is largely conditioned by his training and by his physical and social environment.

It often happens that a national group may appear to be characterized by particular psychological attributes. The superficial view would be that this is due to race. Scientifically, however, we realize that any common psychological attribute is more likely to be due to a common historical and social background, and that such attributes may obscure the fact that, within different populations consisting of many human types, one will find approximately the same range of temperament and intelligence.

6

The scientific material available to us at present does not justify the conclusion that inherited genetic differences are a major factor in producing the differences between the cultures and cultural achievements of different peoples or groups. It

does indicate, on the contrary, that a major factor in explaining such differences is the cultural experience which each group has undergone.

7

There is no evidence for the existence of so-called 'pure' races. Skeletal remains provide the basis of our limited knowledge about earlier races. In regard to race mixture, the evidence points to the fact that human hybridization has been going on for an indefinite but considerable time. Indeed, one of the processes of race formation and race extinction or absorption is by means of hybridization between races. As there is no reliable evidence that disadvantageous effects are produced thereby, no biological justification exists for prohibiting inter-marriage between persons of different races.

8

We now have to consider the bearing of these statements on the problem of human equality. We wish to emphasize that equality of opportunity and equality in law in no way depend, as ethical principles, upon the assertion that human beings are in fact equal in endowment.

9

We have thought it worth while to set out in a formal manner what is at present scientifically established concerning individual and group differences:

- (a) In matters of race, the only characteristics which anthropologists have so far been able to use effectively as a basis for classification are physical (anatomical and physiological).
- (b) Available scientific knowledge provides no basis for believing that the groups of mankind differ in their innate capacity for intellectual and emotional development.
- (c) Some biological differences between human beings within a single race may be as great as, or greater than, the same biological differences between races.
- (d) Vast social changes have occurred that have not been connected in any way with changes in racial type. Historical and sociological studies thus support the view that genetic differences are of little significance in determining the

social and cultural differences between different groups of men.

- (e) There is no evidence that race mixture produces disadvantageous results from a biological point of view. The social results of race mixture, whether for good or ill, can generally be traced to social factors.

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III Proposals on the biological aspects of race

Moscow, August 1964

The undersigned, assembled by Unesco in order to give their views on the biological aspects of the race question and in particular to formulate the biological part for a statement foreseen for 1966 and intended to bring up to date and to complete the declaration on the nature of race and racial differences signed in 1951, have unanimously agreed on the following:

1. All men living today belong to a single species, *homo sapiens*, and are derived from a common stock. There are differences of opinion regarding how and when different human groups diverged from this common stock.

2. Biological differences between human beings are due to differences in hereditary constitution and to the influence of the environment on this genetic potential. In most cases, those differences are due to the interaction of these two sets of factors.

3. There is great genetic diversity within all human populations. Pure races—in the sense of genetically homogeneous populations—do not exist in the human species.

4. There are obvious physical differences between populations living in different geographical areas of the world, in their average appearance. Many of these differences have a genetic component.

Most often the latter consist in differences in the frequency of the same hereditary characters.

5. Different classifications of mankind into major stocks, and of those into more restricted categories (races, which are groups of populations, or single populations) have been proposed on the basis of hereditary physical traits. Nearly all classifications recognize at least three major stocks.

Since the pattern of geographic variation of the character-

istics used in racial classification is a complex one, and since this pattern does not present any major discontinuity, these classifications, whatever they are, cannot claim to classify mankind into clearcut categories; moreover, on account of the complexities of human history, it is difficult to determine the place of certain groups within these racial classifications, in particular that of certain intermediate populations.

Many anthropologists, while stressing the importance of human variation, believe that the scientific interest of these classifications is limited, and even that they carry the risk of inviting abusive generalizations.

Differences between individuals within a race or within a population are often greater than the average differences between races or populations.

Some of the variable distinctive traits which are generally chosen as criteria to characterize a race are either independently inherited or show only varying degrees of association between them within each population. Therefore, the combination of these traits in most individuals does not correspond to the typological racial characterization.

6. In man as well as in animals, the genetic composition of each population is subject to the modifying influence of diverse factors: natural selection, tending towards adaptation to the environment, fortuitous mutations which lead to modifications of the molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid which determine heredity, or random modifications in the frequency of qualitative hereditary characters, to an extent dependent on the patterns of mating and the size of populations.

Certain physical characters have a universal biological value for the survival of the human species, irrespective of the environment. The differences on which racial classifications are based do not affect these characters, and therefore, it is not possible from the biological point of view to speak in any way whatsoever of a general inferiority or superiority of this or that race.

7. Human evolution presents attributes of capital importance which are specific to the species.

The human species which is now spread over the whole world, has a past rich in migrations, in territorial expansions and contractions.

As a consequence, general adaptability to the most diverse environments is in man more pronounced than his adaptation to specific environments.

For long millenniums progress made by man, in any field, seems to have been increasingly, if not exclusively, based on culture and the transmission of cultural achievements and not on the transmission of genetic endowment. This implies a modification in the role of natural selection in man today.

On account of the mobility of human populations and of social factors, mating between members of different human groups which tend to mitigate the differentiations acquired, has played a much more important role in human history than in that of animals. The history of any human population or of any human race, is rich in instances of hybridization and those tend to become more and more numerous.

For man, the obstacles to interbreeding are geographical as well as social and cultural.

8. At all times, the hereditary characteristics of the human populations are in dynamic equilibrium as a result of this interbreeding and of the differentiation mechanisms which were mentioned before. As entities defined by sets of distinctive traits, human races are at any time in a process of emergence and dissolution.

Human races in general present a far less clearcut characterization than many animal races and they cannot be compared at all to races of domestic animals, these being the result of heightened selection for special purposes.

9. It has never been proved that interbreeding has biological disadvantages for mankind as a whole.

On the contrary, it contributes to the maintenance of biological ties between human groups and thus to the unity of the species in its diversity.

The biological consequences of a marriage depend only on the individual genetic make-up of the couple and not on their race.

Therefore, no biological justification exists for prohibiting intermarriage between persons of different races, or for advising against it on racial grounds.

10. Man since his origin has at his disposal ever more efficient cultural means of nongenetic adaptation.

11. Those cultural factors which break social and geographic

barriers, enlarge the size of the breeding populations and so act upon their genetic structure by diminishing the random fluctuations (genetic drift).

12. As a rule, the major stocks extend over vast territories encompassing many diverse populations which differ in language, economy, culture, etc.

There is no national, religious, geographic, linguistic or cultural group which constitutes a race *ipso facto*; the concept of race is purely biological.

However, human beings who speak the same language and share the same culture have a tendency to intermarry, and often there is as a result a certain degree of coincidence between physical traits on the one hand, and linguistic and cultural traits on the other. But there is no known causal nexus between these and therefore it is not justifiable to attribute cultural characteristics to the influence of the genetic inheritance.

13. Most racial classifications of mankind do not include mental traits or attributes as a taxonomic criterion.

Heredity may have an influence in the variability shown by individuals within a given population in their responses to the psychological tests currently applied.

However, no difference has ever been detected convincingly in the hereditary endowments of human groups in regard to what is measured by these tests. On the other hand, ample evidence attests to the influence of physical, cultural and social environment on differences in response to these tests.

The study of this question is hampered by the very great difficulty of determining what part heredity plays in the average differences observed in so-called tests of over-all intelligence between populations of different cultures.

The genetic capacity for intellectual development, like certain major anatomical traits peculiar to the species, is one of the biological traits essential for its survival in any natural or social environment.

The peoples of the world today appear to possess equal biological potentialities for attaining any civilizational level. Differences in the achievements of different peoples must be attributed solely to their cultural history.

Certain psychological traits are at times attributed to particular peoples. Whether or not such assertions are valid, we do

not find any basis for ascribing such traits to hereditary factors, until proof to the contrary is given.

Neither in the field of hereditary potentialities concerning the over all intelligence and the capacity for cultural development, nor in that of physical traits, is there any justification for the concept of 'inferior' and 'superior' races.

The biological data given above stand in open contradiction to the tenets of racism. Racist theories can in no way pretend to have any scientific foundation and the anthropologists should endeavour to prevent the results of their researches from being used in such a biased way that they would serve non-scientific ends.

Moscow, 18 August 1964.

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IV Statement on race and racial prejudice

Paris, September 1967

1. 'All men are born free and equal both in dignity and in rights.' This universally proclaimed democratic principle stands in jeopardy wherever political, economic, social and cultural inequalities affect human group relations. A particularly striking obstacle to the recognition of equal dignity for all is racism. Racism continues to haunt the world. As a major social phenomenon it requires the attention of all students of the sciences of man.

2. Racism stultifies the development of those who suffer from it, perverts those who apply it, divides nations within themselves, aggravates international conflict and threatens world peace.

3. Conference of experts meeting in Paris in September 1967, agreed that racist doctrines lack any scientific basis whatsoever. It reaffirmed the propositions adopted by the international meeting held in Moscow in 1964 which was called to re-examine the biological aspects of the statements on race and racial differences issued in 1950 and 1951. In particular, it draws attention to the following points:

- (a) All men living today belong to the same species and descend from the same stock.
- (b) The division of the human species into 'races' is partly conventional and partly arbitrary and does not imply any hierarchy whatsoever. Many anthropologists stress the importance of human variation, but believe that 'racial' divisions have limited scientific interest and may even carry the risk of inviting abusive generalization.
- (c) Current biological knowledge does not permit us to impute cultural achievements to differences in genetic potential. Differences in the achievements of different peoples should be attributed solely to their cultural history. The peoples

of the world today appear to possess equal biological potentialities for attaining any level of civilization.

Racism grossly falsifies the knowledge of human biology.

4. The human problems arising from so-called 'race' relations are social in origin rather than biological. A basic problem is racism, namely, antisocial beliefs and acts which are based on the fallacy that discriminatory intergroup relations are justifiable on biological grounds.

5. Groups commonly evaluate their characteristics in comparison with others. Racism falsely claims that there is a scientific basis for arranging groups hierarchically in terms of psychological and cultural characteristics that are immutable and innate. In this way it seeks to make existing differences appear inviolable as a means of permanently maintaining current relations between groups.

6. Faced with the exposure of the falsity of its biological doctrines, racism finds ever new stratagems for justifying the inequality of groups. It points to the fact that groups do not intermarry, a fact which follows, in part, from the divisions created by racism. It uses this fact to argue the thesis that this absence of intermarriage derives from differences of a biological order. Whenever it fails in its attempts to prove that the source of group differences lies in the biological field, it falls back upon justifications in terms of divine purpose, cultural differences, disparity of educational standards or some other doctrine which would serve to mask its continued racist beliefs. Thus, many of the problems which racism presents in the world today do not arise merely from its open manifestations, but from the activities of those who discriminate on racial grounds but are unwilling to acknowledge it.

7. Racism has historical roots. It has not been a universal phenomenon. Many contemporary societies and cultures show little trace of it. It was not evident for long periods in world history. Many forms of racism have arisen out of the conditions of conquest, out of the justification of Negro slavery and its aftermath of racial inequality in the West, and out of the colonial relationship. Among other examples is that of anti-semitism, which has played a particular role in history, with Jews being the chosen scapegoat to take the blame for problems and crises met by many societies.

8. The anti-colonial revolution of the twentieth century has opened up new possibilities for eliminating the scourge of racism. In some formerly dependent countries, people formerly classified as inferior have for the first time obtained full political rights. Moreover, the participation of formerly dependent nations in international organizations in terms of equality has done much to undermine racism.

9. There are, however, some instances in certain societies in which groups, victims of racialistic practices, have themselves applied doctrines with racist implications in their struggle for freedom. Such an attitude is a secondary phenomenon, a reaction stemming from men's search for an identity which prior racist theory and racialistic practices denied them. None the less, the new forms of racist ideology, resulting from this prior exploitation, have no justification in biology. They are a product of a political struggle and have no scientific foundation.

10. In order to undermine racism it is not sufficient that biologists should expose its fallacies. It is also necessary that psychologists and sociologists should demonstrate its causes. The social structure is always an important factor. However, within the same social structure, there may be great individual variation in racialistic behaviour, associated with the personality of the individuals and their personal circumstances.

11. The committee of experts agreed on the following conclusions about the social causes of race prejudice :

- (a) Social and economic causes of racial prejudice are particularly observed in settler societies wherein are found conditions of great disparity of power and property, in certain urban areas where there have emerged ghettos in which individuals are deprived of equal access to employment, housing, political participation, education, and the administration of justice, and in many societies where social and economic tasks which are deemed to be contrary to the ethics or beneath the dignity of its members are assigned to a group of different origins who are derided, blamed, and punished for taking on these tasks.
- (b) Individuals with certain personality troubles may be particularly inclined to adopt and manifest racial prejudices. Small groups, associations, and social movements of a certain kind sometimes preserve and transmit racial prejudices. The

foundations of the prejudices lie, however, in the economic and social system of a society.

- (c) Racism tends to be cumulative. Discrimination deprives a group of equal treatment and presents that group as a problem. The group then tends to be blamed for its own condition, leading to further elaboration of racist theory.

12. The major techniques for coping with racism involve changing those social situations which give rise to prejudice, preventing the prejudiced from acting in accordance with their beliefs, and combating the false beliefs themselves.

13. It is recognized that the basically important changes in the social structure that may lead to the elimination of racial prejudice may require decisions of a political nature. It is also recognized, however, that certain agencies of enlightenment, such as education and other means of social and economic advancement, mass media, and law can be immediately and effectively mobilized for the elimination of racial prejudice.

14. The school and other instruments for social and economic progress can be one of the most effective agents for the achievement of broadened understanding and the fulfilment of the potentialities of man. They can equally much be used for the perpetuation of discrimination and inequality. It is therefore essential that the resources for education and for social and economic action of all nations be employed in two ways:

- (a) The schools should ensure that their curricula contain scientific understandings about race and human unity, and that invidious distinctions about peoples are not made in texts and classrooms.
- (b) (i) Because the skills to be gained in formal and vocational education become increasingly important with the processes of technological development, the resources of the schools and other resources should be fully available to all parts of the population with neither restriction nor discrimination;
- (ii) Furthermore, in cases where, for historical reasons, certain groups have a lower average education and economic standing, it is the responsibility of the society to take corrective measures. These measures should ensure, so far as possible, that the limitations of poor environments are not passed on to the children.

In view of the importance of teachers in any educational programme, special attention should be given to their training. Teachers should be made conscious of the degree to which they reflect the prejudices which may be current in their society. They should be encouraged to avoid these prejudices.

15. Governmental units and other organizations concerned should give special attention to improving the housing situations and work opportunities available to victims of racism. This will not only counteract the effects of racism, but in itself can be a positive way of modifying racist attitudes and behaviour.

16. The media of mass communication are increasingly important in promoting knowledge and understanding, but their exact potentiality is not fully known. Continuing research into the social utilization of the media is needed in order to assess their influence in relation to formation of attitudes and behavioural patterns in the field of race prejudice and race discrimination. Because the mass media reach vast numbers of people at different educational and social levels, their role in encouraging or combating race prejudice can be crucial. Those who work in these media should maintain a positive approach to the promotion of understanding between groups and populations. Representation of peoples in stereotypes and holding them up to ridicule should be avoided. Attachment to news reports of racial designations which are not germane to the accounts should also be avoided.

17. Law is among the most important means of ensuring equality between individuals and one of the most effective means of fighting racism.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 and the related international agreements and conventions which have taken effect subsequently can contribute effectively, on both the national and international level, to the fight against any injustice of racist origin.

National legislation is a means of effectively outlawing racist propaganda and acts based upon racial discrimination. Moreover, the policy expressed in such legislation must bind not only the courts and judges charged with its enforcement, but also all agencies of government of whatever level or whatever character.

It is not claimed that legislation can immediately eliminate prejudice. Nevertheless, by being a means of protecting the

victims of acts based upon prejudice, and by setting a moral example backed by the dignity of the courts, it can, in the long run, even change attitudes.

18. Ethnic groups which represent the object of some form of discrimination are sometimes accepted and tolerated by dominating groups at the cost of their having to abandon completely their cultural identity. It should be stressed that the effort of these ethnic groups to preserve their cultural values should be encouraged. They will thus be better able to contribute to the enrichment of the total culture of humanity.

19. Racial prejudice and discrimination in the world today arise from historical and social phenomena and falsely claim the sanction of science. It is, therefore, the responsibility of all biological and social scientists, philosophers, and others working in related disciplines, to ensure that the results of their research are not misused by those who wish to propagate racial prejudice and encourage discrimination.

This statement was prepared by a committee of experts on race and racial prejudice which met at Unesco House, Paris, from 18 to 26 September 1967. The following experts took part in the committee's work:

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